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Abstract
The gaps between male and female outcomes and opportunities are present in several dif-
ferent dimensions and many countries, especially in developing ones. These gaps are likely
to result in lower aggregate productivity because of an ineﬃcient use of women potential.
In this paper we examine the quantitative eﬀects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship and
labor force participation on aggregate income. To do the analysis, we ﬁrst present a
simple theoretical framework illustrating the negative impact of gender gaps on resource
allocation and aggregate labor productivity. We then calibrate and simulate the model
to study the quantitative eﬀects of gender inequality. We show that gender gaps in en-
trepreneurship have important eﬀects on aggregate productivity and labor force gender
gaps on income per capita. Speciﬁcally, our model predicts that if all women are ex-
cluded from entrepreneurship, average output per worker drops by more than 10% and
wages fall by even more, while if all women are excluded from the labor force, income
per capita falls by almost 40%. Our cross-country analysis shows that gender gaps and
income losses are quite similar across income groups but diﬀer importantly across geo-
graphical regions, with a total income loss of 27% in Middle East and North Africa, a
23% loss in South Asia, and a loss of around 15% in the rest of the world.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: E2, O40.
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1 Introduction
Gender inequality is a pervasive feature in many countries, especially developing ones. Gaps
between male and female outcomes and opportunities are present in several dimensions, includ-
ing education, earnings, occupation, access to formal employment, access to entrepreneurship,
access to productive inputs, political representation, or bargaining power inside the house-
hold. Dollar and Gatti (1999), for instance, calculate that, in 1990, only 5% of adult women
had some level of secondary education in the poorest quartile of countries, half of the corre-
sponding level for men. Although the gaps in employment and pay are closing much faster
in developing countries than they did in industrialized ones (Tzannatos 1999), the prevalence
of gender inequality is still sizable, especially in South Asia and the Middle East and North
Africa (Klasen and Lamanna 2009). Moreover, women are underrepresented among top posi-
tions in most countries: even in the most developed countries, the average incidence of females
among employers is less than 30% (World Bank 2001).
Everything else equal, a better use of women's potential in the market is likely to result
in greater macroeconomic eﬃciency. When they are free to choose occupation, for example,
most talented people - independently of their gender - typically organize production carried
out by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. From this point
of view, obstacles to women's access to entrepreneurship reduce the average ability of the
country's entrepreneurs and aﬀect negatively the way production is organized in the economy
and, hence, its eﬃciency.
There are many empirical articles studying the two-way relationship between economic
development and gender inequality, like Goldin (1990), Hill and King (1995), Dollar and Gatti
(1999), Tzannatos (1999), Klasen (2002), or Klasen and Lamanna (2009). This literature has
reached some consensus on the fact that there is a positive eﬀect of economic growth on gender
equality and a negative eﬀect of gender inequality on economic development.1 With respect
of the theoretical literature, several studies have focused on explaining the eﬀects of economic
growth on the gender gap, like Galor and Weil (1996), Fernandez (2009), or Duﬂo (2010).
Other theoretical articles analyze the reverse eﬀect, i.e. the impact of gender inequality on
development. These theories are, in most cases, based on the fertility and children's human
1One remarkable exception is the pioneer study of Barro and Lee (1994). In this paper and in diﬀerent
studies that followed (Barro and Lee 1996, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003) the authors ﬁnd that when they
include male and female primary and secondary schooling in their regressions the coeﬃcient associated with
female schooling is negative. They interpret this negative sign as a reﬂection of a large gap in schooling
between genders which in turn is a proxy for backwardness.
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capital channels, like Galor and Weil (1996), Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Lagerlof (2003) or
Blackden et al. (2006).2 Galor andWeil (1996), for instance, argue that an increase in women's
relative wage increases the cost of raising children, which lowers population growth, increases
education levels and leads to higher labor productivity and higher future growth.
There has been, however, very little theoretical work on the female labor productivity
channel, i.e. on the negative eﬀects of gender inequality in the labor market on current aggre-
gate productivity. Intuitively, assuming that people's ability is distributed randomly, gender
inequality in the labor market is expected to distort the allocation of productive resources and
impact aggregate productivity negatively. Esteve-Volart (2009) is, to our knowledge, the only
paper that highlights this channel. She presents a model of occupational choice and talent het-
erogeneity, and ﬁnds that labor market discrimination leads to lower average entrepreneurial
talent, lower female human capital accumulation. This, in turn, has a negative impact on tech-
nology adoption and innovation and, so, it reduces economic growth. The model, however, is
only used to derive qualitative results but not to perform numerical exercises.
Finally, on the quantitative side, Hsieh et al. (2001) estimates the contribution to U.S.
economic growth from the changing occupational allocation of white women, black men, and
black women between 1960 and 2008. The paper ﬁnds that the improved allocation of talent
within the United States accounts for 17 to 20 percent of growth over this period. 3
In this paper, we develop and calibrate a simple theoretical model illustrating the positive
impact of gender equality on resource allocation and aggregate labor productivity. The model
is then used to quantify the costs of gender inequality and the eﬀects of the existing gender
gaps across countries. We introduce gender inequality into a span-of-control framework based
on Lucas (1978), in which agents are endowed with entrepreneurial talent drawn from a ﬁxed
distribution and the most talented ones choose to become entrepreneurs. Gender inequality
is introduced in the model as an exogenous restriction on women's access to entrepreneurship
and participation in the workforce. When women are excluded from entrepreneurship, a larger
fraction of men become entrepreneurs and, as a result, the average talent of entrepreneurs
decreases. Moreover, since all women are forced to work as employees, the supply of labor
increases and the equilibrium wage rate decreases even further.
We parametrize and simulate the model to quantify the negative eﬀects of gender inequality
2See Cuberes and Teignier (2011, 2012) for a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature
on this topic.
3Rodriguez Mora (2009), Pica and Rodriguez Mora (2011) also study the eﬀects of talent misallocation in
diﬀerent contexts.
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on ﬁrms size, average productivity and income per capita. We ﬁnd that if all women are
excluded from entrepreneurship, average output per worker drops by more than 10% and
wages fall by even more, while if all women are excluded from the labor force, income per
capita falls by almost 40%. In the cross-country analysis, we ﬁnd that gender gaps and their
implied income losses are quite similar across income groups but diﬀer importantly across
geographical regions, with a 27% loss in the Middle East and North Africa, a 23% loss in
South Asia, and a loss around 15% in the other regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical model;
Section 3 explains the calibration and numerical results; Section 4 discusses the quantitative
implications of our model for a large set of countries, and, ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we present a simple static general equilibrium model of agents with hetero-
geneous entrepreneurial skills, as in Lucas (1978). Agents are endowed with a speciﬁc talent
for managing, based on which they decide to work as either entrepreneurs or employees. The
model assumes an underlying distribution of entrepreneurial talent in the population, and
studies the resulting allocation of productive factors across entrepreneurs as well as the size
distribution of ﬁrms.
2.1 Model Setup
The economy we consider has a continuum of agents indexed by their entrepreneurial talent
x, drawn from a cumulative distribution Γ that takes values between z and z¯.4 It is a closed
economy with a workforce of size N and with K units of capital. these two inputs are
inelastically supplied in the market by consumers and then combined by ﬁrms to produce an
homogeneous good.
At each period, agents rent the capital stock they own to ﬁrms in exchange for the rental
rate r, and decide to become either ﬁrm workers, who earn the equilibrium wage rate w, or
entrepreneurs, who earn the proﬁts generated by the ﬁrm they manage.
An agent with entrepreneurial talent level x who manages n units of labor and k units of
capital produces y units of output and earns proﬁts pi (x) = y (x)− rk (x)−wn (x), where the
4In the next section, we justify why we need to assume an upper bound in the talent distribution.
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price of the homogeneous good is normalized to one. As in Lucas (1978) and Buera and Shin
(2011), the production function is given by
y (x) = x
(
kαn1−α
)η
, (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1). The latter parameter, η, measures the span of control
of entrepreneurs and, since it is lower than one, the entrepreneurial technology involves an
element of diminishing returns.
2.2 Agents' optimization
Entrepreneurs choose the labor and capital they hire in order to maximize their current proﬁts
pi. The ﬁrst order conditions that characterize their optimization problem are given by
(1− α) ηxk(x)αηn(x)η(1−α)−1 = w (2)
αηxk(x)αη−1n(x)η(1−α) = r. (3)
Hence, at the optimum, all ﬁrms have a common capital-labor ratio given by equation (4):
k(x)
n(x)
=
α
1− α
w
r
(4)
where k (x) and n (x) denote the optimal capital and labor levels for an entrepreneur with
talent level x. Intuitively, a higher w
r
ratio implies a more intensive use of capital relative
to labor. The solution values for n(x) and k(x) for a given ﬁrm can be obtained combining
equations (2) and (4). Both n(x) and k(x) depend positively on the productivity level x, as
equations (5) and (6) show:
n (x) =
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
]1/(1−η)
(5)
k (x) =
[
xηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
]1/(1−η)
(6)
Given this eﬃcient allocation, agents choose their occupation to maximize their earnings.
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Thus, there is a cutoﬀ talent level z > 0 such that if x ≤ z agents choose to work as employees,
and if x > z agents agents become entrepreneurs. At the cutoﬀ level z, the agent is indiﬀerent
between the two occupations, so that pi (z) ≡ y (z)− wn (z)− rk (z) = w, that is,
z
(
k (z)α n (z)1−α
)η − wn (z)− rk (z) = w. (7)
If they become employees they obviously do not hire any capital or labor input, i.e. k (x) =
n (x) = 0 ∀x < z.
2.3 Equilibrium and Aggregation
In equilibrium, the total demand of capital by entrepreneurs must be equal to the exogenously
given aggregate capital endowment K, and, in the labor market, the total demand of workers
must also be equal to the non-entrepreneurs workforce:
z¯ˆ
z
k(x)dΓ(x) =
K
N
(8)
z¯ˆ
z
n(x)dΓ(x) = Γ(z), (9)
where N denotes total work force, which is equal to total population in the benchmark case.
Aggregate income per capita is equal to total production per capita,
Y
N
=
z¯ˆ
z
x
(
k(x)αn(x)1−α
)η
dΓ(x) (10)
where Y denotes total output.
Plugging (5) and (6) into equation (10) we get total income per capita as a function of the
talent distribution Γ and the equilibrium unknowns (z, w, r):
Y
N
=
[
η
αα (1− α)1−α
rαw1−α
] η
1−η z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) (11)
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a cutoﬀ level z, a set of quantities [n (x) , k (x)]x>z
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the equilibrium
and prices (w, r) such that equations (4) - (9) are satisﬁed, that is agents choose their oc-
cupation optimally, entrepreneurs choose the amount of capital and labor to maximize their
proﬁts, and all markets clear.
As explained in Appendix A, the three equilibrium conditions in equations (7), (8) and
(9) can be summarized in the two equations G(z, w) = 0 and H(z, w) = 0:
H(z, w) = Γ (z)
1−η(1−α)
1−η −
[
η (1− α) k
αη
w
] 1
1−η
z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) = 0, (12)
G(z, w) = w
1
1−η − Φz 11−η
(
α
1− α
Γ (z)
k
)−αη
1−η
w
−η
1−η = 0. (13)
where Φ is a constant.
Appendix A also shows that, for values of z high enough, the function H(z, w) has a
negative slope in the (z, w) diagram, dw
dz
|H(z,w)=0< 0, while the function G (z, w) has a positive
slope, dw
dz
|G(z,w)=0> 0 . Intuitively, H (z, w) = 0 is downward sloping because a larger z implies
a lower number of entrepreneurs and more workers and, therefore, a lower equilibrium wage to
clear the worker's market. G (z, w) = 0, on the other hand, is upward sloping because larger
z implies a larger proﬁt pi (z) and, therefore, a larger w is needed to get the occupational
indiﬀerence at z. The intersection of the two equations deﬁnes the equilibrium, as ﬁgure (1)
shows.
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2.4 Equilibrium with Gender Gaps
2.4.1 Gender Gaps in Entrepreneurship
We introduce gender inequality in entrepreneurship in our setup by imposing that only a
randomly selected fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the population is eligible to be entrepreneur. That
is, assuming that men and women have the exact same talent distribution and given that
the percentage of women in the population is around 50%, if all women are excluded from
entrepreneurship, the parameter θ takes a value equal to 1/2. When a randomly slected
fraction 1 − θ of the population is excluded from the pool of potential entrepreneurs, the
talent distribution becomes
Γ˜ = θΓ, (14)
and the labor market clearing condition becomes
z¯ˆ
z
n(x)dΓ˜(x) = (1− θ) + Γ˜(z). (15)
In words, the supply of workers has now two components: those with skill below z, Γ (z), and
those with skill greater or equal than z who are not allowed to be entrepreneurs, (1− θ) (1− Γ (z)).
Therefore, the total labor labor supply is equal to
Γ (z) + (1− θ) (1− Γ (z)) = 1− θ + θΓ (z) = (1− θ) + Γ˜(z).
The capital market clearing condition is the same as before, except for the talent distribu-
tion of entrepreneurs, which is now Γ˜ = θΓ:
z¯ˆ
z
k(x)dΓ˜(x) =
K
N
. (16)
As before, the three equilibrium conditions in equations (7), (15) and (16) can be summarized
in the two equations G˜(z, w) = 0 and H˜(z, w) = 0:
H˜ (z, w) = 1− θ + Γ˜ (z)−
(
η (1− α)
w
) 1
1−η
(
1− θ + Γ˜ (z)
k
)−αη
1−η z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η dΓ˜(x) = 0, (17)
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Figure 2: Graphical eﬀects of entrepreneurial inequality
G˜ (z, w) = w
1
1−η − Φz 11−η
(
α
1− α
1− θ + Γ˜ (z)
k
)−αη
1−η
= 0. (18)
As explained in Appendix B, H˜ (z, w) is downward sloping in the (z, w) diagram and
G˜ (z, w) is upward sloping when z is not too small.
Eﬀects of an increase in the gender gap. Graphically, an increase in gender inequality,
i.e. a decrease in θ, leads to a downward shift of both G˜ (z, w) = 0 and H˜ (z, w) = 0. As
a result, the equilibrium wage w will be always lower under gender inequality, as well as the
threshold level z given that the shift in H˜ (z, w) = 0 is larger than the shift in G˜ (z, w) =
0.5 Figure (2) shows the equilibrium change in this case. Intuitively, an increase in gender
inequality reduces the pool of workers eligible for entrepreneurship, which aﬀects negatively
the equilibrium productivity of entrepreneurs. This leads to a lower threshold level z and to
lower aggregate productivity which clearly aﬀects the equilibrium wage rate negatively.
2.4.2 Gender Inequality in Labor Force Participation
Another type of gender inequality that can be introduced in the model is the exclusion of
women from the work force, both as entrepreneurs and employees, as in Esteve-Volart (2011).
If we keep the capital stock ﬁxed, when a fraction of women does not supply labor to the
market, output per worker mechanically increases. Income per capita, however, decreases.
Formally, recalling that N denotes the total labor force and deﬁning P as total population,
5See Appendix B for a formal proof.
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we have
Y
P
=
N
P
z¯ˆ
z
x
(
k(x)αn(x)1−α
)η
dΓ(x).
With this formulation, it is then possible to study the impact of reducing the employment-
to-population ratio n = N/P below 1.
3 Model Simulation
3.1 Skill Distribution
To simulate the model, we use a Pareto function for the talent distribution, as in Lucas (1978)
and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011).6 We assume an upper bound z¯ on talent to guarantee
that the talent distribution is bounded.7 Hence, the cumulative distribution of talent is
Γ (x) =
1−Bρx−ρ
1−Bρz¯−ρ , 0 ≤ x ≤ z¯ (19)
where ρ,B > 0, and the density function of talent is
γ (x) =
ρBρx−ρ−1
1−Bρz¯−ρ , , 0 ≤ x ≤ z¯. (20)
Using equations (5) and (20), we can derive the density function of the ﬁrms' size,
s (n) = γ
(
n−1 (x)
)
= γ
(
n1−η
η(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)−αη
w−αη+1
r−αη
)
=
ρBρ
1−Bρz¯−ρn
−(1−η)(1+ρ)
(
η(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
)1+ρ
, (21)
which shows that the distribution of ﬁrms size is also Pareto and, if (1− η) (1 + ρ) = 1, it
satisﬁes Zipf's law.8
6See Gabaix (2008) for a detailed summary of the applications of the Pareto distribution.
7 If we want to use an unbounded Pareto distribution, i.e. z¯ → ∞, we need to assume that ρ > 11−η so
that the integral
´ z¯
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) is deﬁned, as explained in Appendix C. Note, however, that this would imply
(1 + ρ) > 1(1−η) , which contradicts Zipf's Law for the distrubution of ﬁrms' size.
8As Gabaix (2008) explains, empirical research has established that, to a good degree of approximation,
the distribution of ﬁrms' size follows Zipf's Law, at least in the US. See also Axtell (2001).
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Explanation
B 1 Normalization
η 0.8 Buera and Shin (2011)
ρ 4
To satisfy Zipf's Law for ﬁrms distribtuion,
− (1− η) (−1− ρ) ≈ 1
α 0.375 To match capital share, αη=0.3
z¯ 7.8 ∗B To match average fraction of entrepreneurs
in the data, which is 3.55%
3.2 Parameter Values
Table (1) shows the values used in the simulations for the diﬀerent parameters of the model.
The parameter B of the Pareto distribution is normalized to 1. The span-of-control parameter
η is chosen equal to 0.8, following Buera and Shin (2011).9 The value used for the parameter
ρ is set equal to 4 so that the talent distribution satisﬁes Zipf's Law.10 The capital exponent
parameter α is set to 0.375 in order to make αη equal to 30%, as in Buera and Shin (2011),
since 30% is the value typically used for the aggregate income share of capital and we are
considering the entrepreneurs' earnings as labor income. Finally, the talent upper bound z¯ is
chosen equal to 7.2 times B, to make the world-average share of entrepreneurs predicted by
the model match the one observed in our data set.11
3.3 Quantitative eﬀects of entrepreneurial gaps
To show the eﬀects of gender inequality in entrepreneurship, we now compare the talent
distribution and the ﬁrms size distribution when there is no gender inequality, θ = 1, with the
one in which all women are excluded from entrepreneurship, θ = 0.5. Figure (3) shows that
when 50% of the workforce are not eligible as entrepreneurs, the talent threshold z decreases
and the entire talent distribution shifts to the left. Figure (4) shows that when there is a
9Buera and Shin (2011) calibrate η from the fraction of total income of the top ﬁve per cent of earners in
the US population, which is 30%, given that top earners are mostly entrepreneurs both in the data and in the
model.
10This is similar to the value used by Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), 4.84, which is chosen to match the
employment share of the largest 10 percent of establishments in the US..
11The world-average fraction of entrepreneurs in the data is estimated using data on the variable Employers
from the International Labor Organization, Table 3 - Status in Employment (by sex), where the weights of
each country are equal to the country's employment over total employment.
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Figure 3: Talent distribution
gender gap in entrepreneurial access, the entire ﬁrm size distribution shifts to the left and, at
all talent levels, ﬁrms are now larger while the density is now lower.
Finally, Figure (5) shows the negative eﬀects of gender inequality on average productivity
and workers' wages. The higher is the percentage of population excluded from entrepreneur-
ship, the larger the loss in income per worker with respect to the no-gender-inequality case.
We can see that when the fraction of agents excluded from the workforce is 50%, output per
worker is 88% of the one with no gender inequality, because of the gender gap eﬀect on pro-
ductivity. In other words, if the gender gap is the highest possible one, the loss in output per
worker is slightly above 10%. The loss in worker wages, on the other hand, is slightly higher
since there is a workers' supply increase eﬀect on top of the productivity eﬀect.
When interpreting the results, it is important to keep in mind that we are assuming that
men and women have exactly the same talent distribution. This assumption may not be very
accurate for some developing countries in which women have less education than men and,
as a result, they are likely to be less skilled. These results, thus, are capturing the eﬀects of
gender inequality in access to entrepreneurship as well as access to those education programs
that give the necessary skills to become entrepreneurs.
Also, it is important to note we are modeling the economy as if there was only one produc-
tion sector, while in the real world there are many diﬀerent sectors, probably with diﬀerent
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of gender gaps in entrepreneurship
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of gender gaps in labor force participation
returns to entrepreneurial ability. To the extent that gender gaps in entrepreneurship are
stronger in some sectors than others, the economic losses due to entrepreneurial gaps may be
larger or smaller than computed here. If, for instance, entrepreneurial inequality is higher in
sectors with larger span of control of entrepreneurs, we would be underestimating the true
eﬀects of gender inequality.
3.4 Quantitative eﬀects of labor force gaps
If we simulate the model with a fraction of the population excluded from the workplace, we
get that output per worker increases because there are diminishing returns to scale to labor
keeping the stock of capital constant. However, income per capita obviously decreases since
fewer people actually work. As Figure (6) shows, the larger the gender gap in the labor force -
i.e. the further we move to the left of the horizontal axis, the higher is the income loss. When
50% of the population are excluded from the labor force, for instance, the income per capita
loss with respect to the no-exclusion case is almost 40%.
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3.5 Robustness analysis
In this subsection we compare the parameter values used in previous subsections to other
values considered in the literature, in order analyze the sensitivity of our results to other
possible speciﬁcations. Table (2) below summarizes the results.
Span-of-control parameter η. To our knowledge, Bohacek and Rodriguez-Mendizabal
(2011) and Bhattacharya et al. (2011) are the only available studies providing diﬀerent es-
timates for the span-of-control parameter. Bohacek and Rodriguez-Mendizabal (2011) use a
value of η = 0.912 for the entrepreneurial control parameter since this is the value estimated
by Burnside (1996) using output data. In our setting, we can use η = 0.912 if we set ρ = 10.36
and z¯ = 2 ∗ B. In this case, we get that the loss in output per worker due to gender gaps in
entrepreneurship is only around 4%, while there is no change in the income per capita loss
due to gender inequality in labor force participation. Bhattacharya et al. (2011), on the other
hand, use η = 0.76, which imply ρ = 3.17 and z¯ = 14∗B in our setting. This parametrization
leads to a loss in output per worker due to entrepreneurial gender gaps of almost 15%.
Capital share in variable factors parameter, α. Setting α equal to 0.375 in order to
make αη equal to 30% implicitly assumes that the income of entrepreneurs' income is part of
the labor income in the national accounts. Another possibility is that it is considered part of
the capital income, which implies making αη + (1 − η) = 0.3 and α = 0.125. Using η = 0.8,
ρ = 4 and z¯ = 7.2 ∗B, as in the baseline simulation, and α = 0.125 we get the loss in income
per capita due to gender gaps in labor force participation, and a slightly smaller loss in output
per worker due to gender gaps in entrepreneurs, 11% instead of 12%.
4 Cross-country results
In this section, we use data on employers and labor force participation by gender to estimate
the eﬀects of labor market gender gaps on the income per capita of 88 countries for the
latest available year.12 The data used is from the International Labor Organization (Table 3
- Status in Employment, by sex) for the latest available year, and it includes both developed
and developing countries and the World Bank World Development Indicators. It is important
12Appendix D shows the results of our simulation by country.
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Table 2: Robustness analysis
Baseline
simulation
ηfrom
Bohacek,
Rodriguez
(2011)
ηfrom
Battacharya
et al.
(2011)
Capital share
αη + (1− η) = 0.3
ρ 4 10.4 3.17 4
η 0.8 0.912 0.76 0.8
z¯/B 7.8 1.94 14 7.2
Productivity
loss due to
entrepreneurs'
gender gaps
0.12 0.045 0.145 0.11
Income
loss due to
labor force
gender gaps
0.38 0.38 0.38 0.46
to note that from we compute the gender gap in entrepreneurship by taking the diﬀerence in
the fraction of entrepreneurs among male and females and normalizing it using the diﬀerence
in labor force participation between males and females.13 If men and women were identical in
all dimensions, these two variables could be interpreted as the percentage of women who are
discriminated from entrepreneurship and the labor force respectively, but there may be reasons
other than discrimination that explain this gap or diﬀerence between men and women.14
In ﬁgure (7), we can see the total income loss caused by the two gender gaps and the
relation between the two gender gaps for all countries in our sample. The ﬁrst plot shows that
the total loss in income goes from more than 40% in some countries to less than 5% in some
others, and it has a slightly negative relation with the income per capita level. The second
plot shows that the relation between the loss caused by the mangerial gender gap and the loss
caused by the labor force participation gap is positive.
Tables (3) and (4) below show the results for diﬀerent groups of countries. The variable
Entrepreneurs' gender gap is deﬁned as the gap between males and females in the fraction of
13Someone could argue that the ratio of male and female entrepreneurs should be compared directly i.e.
without normalizing it, but in our model, agents ﬁrst enter the labor force and then decide to become en-
trepreneurs. Because of the way we calculate the gender gaps in entrepreneurship, we could then have negative
gender gaps (i.e. larger fraction of working women in employer positions), in which case we just proceed as if
there was no gap at all.
14To make the reading easier, we will refer to the numbers in these variables as the percentage of women
excluded from entrepreneurship or from the labor force, but we do not know whether this exclusion is voluntary
or not.
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Figure 7: Cross-country income losses caused by gender gaps
Data sources: Penn World Tables, version 7.0; own calculations.
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Table 3: Income loss due to gender gaps, by income groups
Number Entrepreneurs' Labor force part. Income loss Income loss Income loss
countries gender gap gender gap (total) (entrepr.) (lfp)
Low Income 10 0.53 0.28 0.15 0.05 0.10
Lower-Middle 25 0.58 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.12
Upper-Middle 23 0.56 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.12
High Income 30 0.64 0.25 0.15 0.06 0.09
entrepreneurs in the working population, while the variable Labor force participation gender
gap is deﬁned as the gap in labor force participation between men and women. The variable
Income loss (total) gives us the percentage loss in income per capita due to gender gaps in
the labor market in the form of entrepreneurs and labor force participation. The variable
Income loss (entrepr.) gives the percentage loss in income per capita due to the gender gap
in entrepreneurship, while the variable Income loss (lfp) gives the percentage loss in income
per capita due to the gender gap in labor force participation, so it is the diﬀerence between
the other two.
Table (3) gives the average of these ﬁve variables for four groups of countries, according
to their income level. In low income countries, for example, more than 50% of women are
excluded from entrepreneurship, which , according to our calculations, creates an average
income loss of 5%; the percentage of women that are excluded from the labor force, on the
other hand, is 28% which generates an output loss of 10%. The sum of these two output
losses gives the total income loss due to gender gaps in the labor market. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, the results for the other three income groups are quite similar to the ones just
described. High-income countries, for instance, have a larger gender gap in entrepreneurship,
which results in a total output loss of 15%.
In table (4) we split our sample of countries in geographic regions (East Asia and Paciﬁc,
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa,
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa). We ﬁnd some interesting diﬀerences in gender gaps,
which lead to some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the implied income losses. The region with larger
income losses due to gender gaps Middle East and North Africa where, according to our
estimates, the entrepreneurs' gap is 77% whereas the labor participation gap is 53%. These
diﬀerences between men and women generate an income loss of 7% and 20% respectively, so a
total income loss of 27%. South Asia has the second largest income losses due to gender gaps
(23%), mostly due to its large gender gap in labor force participation (47%), while Europe
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Table 4: Income loss due to gender gaps, by regional groups
Number Entrepreneurs' Labor force part. Income loss Income loss Income loss
countries gender gap gender gap (total) (entrepr.) (lfp)
East Asia & Paciﬁc 12 0.53 0.28 0.15 0.05 0.10
Europe & Central Asia 33 0.63 0.23 0.14 0.06 0.08
Latin America & Caribbean 20 0.54 0.33 0.17 0.05 0.12
Middle East & North Africa 8 0.77 0.53 0.27 0.07 0.20
South Asia 5 0.6 0.47 0.23 0.05 0.17
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 0.44 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.09
and Central Asia display the second largest gap in entrepreneurship (63%).
Obviously, more work needs to be done to interpret these diﬀerences across income and
geographical levels. It is clear that our measure of entrepreneurs and total labor gaps may
reﬂect diﬀerences in the labor market (due to both demand and supply factors) as well as
cultural factors. The goal of this exercise is to provide some quantitative estimates of the
magnitude of these gaps and of their impact on the aggregate economy.
5 Conclusion
This paper quantiﬁes the eﬀects of gender gaps in the labor market on aggregate productivity
and income per capita. Our numerical results show that the gender gap in entrepreneurs
has signiﬁcant eﬀects on resource allocation and aggregate productivity, while the gap from
formal employment does not aﬀect productivity but has large eﬀects on income per capita.
Speciﬁcally, if no women works as an entrepreneur, output per worker would drop by more
than 10%, while if the labor force participation of women was zero, income per capita would
decrease by almost 40%.
When we do the country-by-country analysis, we ﬁnd that gender gaps do not diﬀer much
across income groups, but there are very important diﬀerences across geographical regions.
According to our calculations, gender inequality in low income countries creates an average
loss of 15% in GDP per capita, which is due to both gaps in entrepreneurs (5%) and in labor
force participation (10%). The region with the largest income loss due to gender inequality is
Middle East and North Africa, with a total income loss of 27%, 7% coming from entrepreneurs'
gaps and 20% from labor force participation. South Asia experiences the second largest income
loss due to gender inequality (23%) and Europe and Central Asia display the second largest
gap in entrepreneurs (63%).
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In terms of future research, we are considering to extend this framework in two diﬀerent
directions. First, introducing a household production sector leading to a division of labor
between husbands and wives, as in Becker (1981), which could explain some of the observed
diﬀerences in labor participation and access to entrepreneurship between males and females
without the need to assume gender discrimination. Second, we plan to make a dynamic
version of the span-of-control model presented in this paper (see for instance, Caselli and
Gennaioli 2012), which would make possible to quantify the eﬀects of gender gaps on capital
accumulation and economic growth.
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A Derivation of functions H (z, w) and G (z, w)
A.1 Three equilibrium conditions in unknowns (z, w, r)
If we substitute equations (5) and (6) into equations (7), (8) and (9), we get the three equi-
librium equations which determine the three unknowns (z, w, r). First, when we replace (5)
and (6) into (7),
z
[zηα(1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
] α
1−η [
zη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
] 1−α
1−η
η
−w
[
zη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
] 1
1−η
− r
[
zηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
] 1
1−η
= w
⇔ [
z
(
rαw1−α
ηαα (1− α)1−α
)−η] 11−η
−
[
zαη
((
α
1−α
)1−α
rαw1−α
)−η] 11−η
−
[
z (1− α) η ((1−α
α
)α
rαw1−α
)−η] 11−η
= w
⇔
z
1
1−η
(
rαw1−α
)− η
1−η Φ = w (22)
where Φ is deﬁned as
Φ ≡ (ηαα (1− α)1−α) η1−η − (η(1− α)( α
1− α
)αη) 11−η
−
(
ηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)) 11−η
.
Second, when we substitute (6) into (8),
z¯ˆ
z
[
xηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
] 1
1−η
dΓ(x) =
K
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) 1
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x
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K
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(23)
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where Ω is deﬁned as
Ω ≡
(
ηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)) 11−η
.
Third, when we substitute (5) into (9),
z¯ˆ
z
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
] 1
1−η
dΓ(x) = Γ(z)
⇔ (
wαη−1
rαη
) 1
1−η
Ψ
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z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) = Γ(z) (24)
where Ψis deﬁned as
Ψ ≡
(
η (1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη) 11−η
.
A.2 Functions H (z, w) and G (z, w)
Using then equations (23) and (24) we can write the equilibrium interest rate r as a function
of the other two unknowns:
r =
α
1− α
Γ (z)
k
w.
If we then replace it in equations (22) and (24), the three equilibrium conditions in equations
(22), (23) and (24) can be summarized in the two equations G(z, w) = 0 and H(z, w) = 0.
First, when we substitute r = α
1−α
Γ(z)
k
w into (24),
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
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1− α
α
k
wΓ (z)
)αη] 11−η z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) = Γ(z)
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1−η −
[
η (1− α) k
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w
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z
x
1
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Second, when we substitute into r = α
1−α
Γ(z)
k
w into (22),
z
1
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k
w
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k
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A.3 Slopes of H (z, w) and G (z, w)
From equation H (z, w) = 0, we can obtain the following two partial derivatives:
∂H (z, w)
∂w
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From equation G (z, w) = 0, we can obtain the following two partial derivatives:
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15For the talent distribution assumed in section 4, that is the Pareto function, zΓ
′(z)
Γ(z) =
ρBρz−ρ
1−Bρz−ρ =
ρ
( zB )
ρ−1 .
Hence, lim
z→∞
(
zΓ′(z)
Γ(z)
)
= 0 so that lim
z→∞
(
dw
dz |G(z,w)=0
)
< 0, and lim
z→B
(
zΓ′(z)
Γ(z)
)
=∞ so that lim
z→B
(
dw
dz |G(z,w)=0
)
>
0.
26
B Derivations of functions H˜ (z, w) and G˜ (z, w)
If we proceed as before and substitute equations (5) and (6) into equations (7), (16) and
(15), we get three equilibrium equations which determine the three unknowns (z, w, r). These
equations can then be summarized in two equations in the two unknowns (z, w):
H˜ (z, w) = 1− θ + Γ˜ (z)−
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Taking the partial derivatives of both functions with respect to z and w, we can easily see
that ∂H˜(z,w)
∂w
> 0, ∂H˜(z,w)
∂z
> 0, ∂G˜(z,w)
∂w
> 0, and that ∂G˜(z,w)
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Therefore, dw
dz
|H˜(z,w)=0= −
∂H˜(z,w)
∂z
∂H˜(z,w)
∂w
< 0 and, if αη zΓ
′(z)
1/θ−1+Γ(z) < 1,
dw
dz
|G˜(z,w)=0= −
∂G˜(z,w)
∂z
∂G˜(z,w)
∂w
> 0,
which implies that H˜ (z, w) is downward sloping and G˜ (z, w) is upward sloping.
To know the eﬀect of a change in θ on the equilibrium talent threshold z, we can use
H˜ (z, w) and G˜ (z, w) to obtain a new equilibrium condition in terms of the unknown z:
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We can now easily see the sign of the partial derivatives of F˜ (z, w):
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Hence, there is a positive relation between z and θ:
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C Talent distribution
When we write the talent distribution with an upper bound equal to z,
z¯ˆ
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.
As a result, the market clearing conditions in equations (23) and (24) become:
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D Country-by-country results16
Year
Income Region Entrepr. LFP Income Loss due to Loss due to
group group gender gap gender gap loss entrepr. GG LFP GG
Algeria 2004 2 MENA 0.7769 0.5603 0.2732 0.0677 0.2055
Argentina 2006 3 LAC 0.5259 0.3474 0.1719 0.0469 0.1250
Australia 2007 4 EAP 0.3645 0.2028 0.1052 0.0331 0.0721
16Variable 1: country; variable 2: year; variable 3: World Bank income group (1: Low Income, 2: Lower-Middle,
3: Upper-Middle, 4: High Income); variable 4: World Bank region (EAP: East Asia and Paciﬁc, EUCA: Europe
and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: Middle East and North Africa, NAM: North
America and Mexico, SA: South Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa); variable 5: gender gap in entrepreneurs
(fraction of women excluded from entrepreneurship relative to men; source: own calculations from ILO data);
variable 6: gender gap in labor force participation (fraction of women excluded from the labor force relative to
men; source: own calculations from ILO data); variable 7: total income loss due to gender gaps (source: own
results); variable 8: income loss due to entrepreneurs' gender gap (source: own results); variable 9: income
loss due to labor force participation gender gap (source: own results).
28
Year
Income Region Entrepr. LFP Income Loss due to Loss due to
group group gender gap gender gap loss entrepr. GG LFP GG
Austria 2007 4 EUCA 0.5731 0.2309 0.1366 0.0543 0.0823
Azerbaijan 2007 2 EUCA 0.8488 0.1549 0.1449 0.0900 0.0549
Bangladesh 2005 1 SA 0.6445 0.3407 0.1821 0.0596 0.1225
Barbados 2004 3 LAC 0.7530 0.1557 0.1326 0.0774 0.0552
Belgium 2007 4 EUCA 0.6471 0.2383 0.1474 0.0624 0.0850
Belize 2005 3 LAC 0.4673 0.4457 0.2011 0.0393 0.1618
Bhutan 2005 1 SA 0.5790 0.5383 0.2452 0.0481 0.1971
Bolivia 2002 2 LAC 0.6756 0.2488 0.1543 0.0655 0.0888
Botswana 2003 3 SSA 0.2709 0.2594 0.1161 0.0235 0.0927
Brazil 2006 2 LAC 0.5131 0.2878 0.1498 0.0468 0.1031
Bulgaria 2007 2 EUCA 0.5337 0.1875 0.1175 0.0509 0.0666
Cambodia 2004 1 EAP 0.5197 0.0847 0.0812 0.0513 0.0298
Cameroon 2001 2 SSA 0.4661 0.3143 0.1543 0.0415 0.1128
Canada 2007 4 NAM 0.5980 0.1438 0.1099 0.0590 0.0509
Chile 2007 3 LAC 0.5558 0.4583 0.2142 0.0476 0.1666
Colombia 2007 2 LAC 0.4614 0.1949 0.1123 0.0430 0.0693
Costa Rica 2007 3 LAC 0.5582 0.4544 0.2130 0.0479 0.1651
Cyprus 2007 4 MENA 0.8494 0.2329 0.1704 0.0874 0.0830
Czech Republic 2007 3 EUCA 0.6090 0.2500 0.1471 0.0579 0.0892
Denmark 2007 4 EUCA 0.7199 0.1465 0.1254 0.0736 0.0518
Dominican Rep 2007 2 LAC 0.4655 0.2260 0.1235 0.0429 0.0805
Ecuador 2006 2 LAC 0.4181 0.3418 0.1593 0.0363 0.1229
El Salvador 2006 2 LAC 0.4933 0.4177 0.1936 0.0423 0.1513
Estonia 2007 3 EUCA 0.6964 0.1662 0.1290 0.0701 0.0589
Ethiopia 2006 1 SSA 0.6193 0.1330 0.1088 0.0617 0.0470
Fiji 2005 2 EAP 0 0.5025 0.1834 0 0.1834
Finland 2007 4 EUCA 0.6486 0.1138 0.1059 0.0657 0.0402
France 2007 4 EUCA 0.5986 0.1968 0.1278 0.0579 0.0699
Georgia 2007 2 EUCA 0.7442 0.2397 0.1594 0.0739 0.0855
Germany 2007 4 EUCA 0.6288 0.2227 0.1401 0.0607 0.0793
Greece 2007 4 EUCA 0.6115 0.3338 0.1762 0.0562 0.1200
29
Year
Income Region Entrepr. LFP Income Loss due to Loss due to
group group gender gap gender gap loss entrepr. GG LFP GG
Guatemala 2002 2 LAC 0.6571 0.5890 0.2711 0.0544 0.2167
Hong Kong, China 2007 4 EAP 0.7207 0.2371 0.1557 0.0711 0.0846
Hungary 2007 3 EUCA 0.5670 0.2593 0.1457 0.0530 0.0926
Iceland 2007 4 EUCA 0.5885 0.1100 0.0975 0.0587 0.0388
Indonesia 2007 2 EAP 0.6321 0.4233 0.2095 0.0562 0.1533
Ireland 2007 4 EUCA 0.7171 0.2611 0.1633 0.0700 0.0933
Israel 2007 4 MENA 0.7357 0.1617 0.1324 0.0751 0.0573
Italy 2007 4 EUCA 0.5668 0.3623 0.1814 0.0508 0.1306
Jamaica 2006 2 LAC 0.4582 0.0672 0.0684 0.0448 0.0236
Japan 2007 4 EAP 0.6990 0.3333 0.1857 0.0659 0.1198
Kazakhstan 2004 2 EUCA 0.6034 0.1480 0.1119 0.0596 0.0524
Latvia 2007 3 EUCA 0.6268 0.2232 0.1400 0.0605 0.0795
Lithuania 2007 3 EUCA 0.6902 0.1639 0.1275 0.0694 0.0581
Luxembourg 2007 4 EUCA 0.5689 0.2563 0.1448 0.0533 0.0915
Malaysia 2007 3 EAP 0.7093 0.4412 0.2241 0.0640 0.1601
Malta 2007 4 EUCA 0.7733 0.5206 0.2589 0.0686 0.1903
Mauritius 2007 3 SSA 0.6659 0.4494 0.2223 0.0591 0.1632
Mexico 2007 3 LAC 0.6104 0.4850 0.2291 0.0525 0.1767
Mongolia 2003 1 EAP 0.4048 0.0508 0.0571 0.0393 0.0179
Morocco 2007 2 MENA 0.8065 0.6912 0.3232 0.0663 0.2568
Namibia 2004 2 SSA 0.3464 0.1900 0.0989 0.0314 0.0675
Nepal 2001 1 SA 0.0340 0.3091 0.1136 0.0027 0.1109
Netherlands 2007 4 EUCA 0.6691 0.2028 0.1380 0.0659 0.0721
New Zealand 2007 4 EAP 0.5465 0.1797 0.1162 0.0525 0.0638
Nicaragua 2006 2 LAC 0.5366 0.5782 0.2557 0.0432 0.2125
Norway 2007 4 EUCA 0.5703 0.1211 0.0991 0.0563 0.0428
Oman 2000 3 MENA 0.6881 0.7050 0.3165 0.0542 0.2623
Pakistan 2007 1 SA 0.8734 0.7553 0.3534 0.0709 0.2825
Panama 2007 3 LAC 0.5434 0.4013 0.1927 0.0476 0.1451
Paraguay 2007 2 LAC 0.5700 0.1583 0.1116 0.0555 0.0561
Peru 2007 2 LAC 0.5396 0.2220 0.1299 0.0509 0.0790
30
Year
Income Region Entrepr. LFP Income Loss due to Loss due to
group group gender gap gender gap loss entrepr. GG LFP GG
Philippines 2007 2 EAP 0.5468 0.3775 0.1846 0.0484 0.1362
Poland 2007 3 EUCA 0.4678 0.2295 0.1249 0.0431 0.0818
Portugal 2007 4 EUCA 0.5533 0.2000 0.1239 0.0528 0.0711
Qatar 2004 4 MENA 0.8796 0.5582 0.2840 0.0793 0.2047
Romania 2007 3 EUCA 0.6356 0.2283 0.1427 0.0614 0.0814
Russian Federation 2007 3 EUCA 0.3478 0.1725 0.0930 0.0318 0.0612
Singapore 2007 4 EAP 0.5942 0.2947 0.1608 0.0552 0.1056
Slovenia 2007 4 EUCA 0.6141 0.1938 0.1286 0.0597 0.0689
South Africa 2007 3 SSA 0 0.2167 0.0771 0 0.0771
Spain 2007 4 EUCA 0.5288 0.3088 0.1588 0.0480 0.1108
Sri Lanka 2007 2 SA 0.8206 0.4293 0.2327 0.0770 0.1556
Sweden 2007 4 EUCA 0.7260 0.1217 0.1180 0.0750 0.0430
Switzerland 2007 4 EUCA 0.5958 0.2027 0.1295 0.0575 0.0721
Syrian Arab Rep 2001 2 MENA 0.8598 0.7783 0.3604 0.0686 0.2918
Thailand 2007 2 EAP 0.6377 0.1788 0.1263 0.0628 0.0634
Trinidad and Tobago 2005 3 LAC 0.4951 0.2842 0.1467 0.0450 0.1017
Turkey 2007 3 EUCA 0.8230 0.6514 0.3106 0.0695 0.2411
Uganda 2003 1 SSA 0.5119 0.1055 0.0873 0.0501 0.0372
United Arab Emirates 2005 4 MENA 0.5443 0.5796 0.2569 0.0439 0.2130
United Kingdom 2007 4 EUCA 0.6598 0.2029 0.1369 0.0648 0.0721
Uruguay 2007 3 LAC 0.5302 0.2973 0.1549 0.0484 0.1066
Zambia 2003 1 SSA 0.6663 0.2728 0.1613 0.0638 0.0976
Zimbabwe 2002 1 SSA 0.4417 0.2038 0.1133 0.0408 0.0725
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